

New Research on Gender in Political Psychology Conference

“Unpacking the Gender Gap: Analysis of U.S. Latino Immigrant Generations.”

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### **Abstract**

In this paper, I examine the developmental theory of the gender gap among Latinos. I examine cross-national comparisons and trends over time, as well as across generational cohorts. I use data from the World Values Survey and the 2006 Latino National Survey, to compare the size and direction of the Latino ideological gender gap. I hypothesize that later generations of Latinos will be more likely than first generation Latinos to show evidence of a realignment process in their political ideology, where women will move to the left of the men in later generations. This process can reveal the influence of structural and cultural factors on the Latino gender gap, as well as evidence of a modern gender gap. Next, I hypothesize that later generations of Latinos will also be more likely than first generation Latinos to show evidence of a realignment process in their levels of political interest. I find evidence of realignment in Latina political attitudes, with Latinas in later generations reporting a more liberal political ideology.

Many questions are still left unanswered on the phenomenon of gender gaps, including the direction and perseverance of the gap within and among a variety of societies. The gender gap in regards to political behavior refers to observable differences in voting behavior, partisanship, and cultural attitudes among men and women (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003) provide a valuable comparative analysis of the gender gap in over seventy nations; their goals include evaluating whether other countries have shared similar experiences with the gender gap as the United States. In the 1980s, the U.S. was one of the first countries to experience a modern form of the gender gap and evidence of this gap became evident in many other post-industrial nations in the 1990s (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003). This modern gender gap is a realignment process with women moving toward the left of men in a variety of political beliefs and behaviors, including a greater proportion of women than men supporting the Democratic Party (2003).

In this paper, I extend the Inglehart and Norris comparative analysis of the developmental theory of the gender gap (2000, 2003). Their developmental theory of gender realignment argues “that structural developments lead to, and interact with, cultural shifts that tend to reshape political values” (2003:79). As a result of modernization in postindustrial societies, women’s lives have changed in relation to increased opportunities in the labor force, attaining higher education, and changing cultural attitudes. In contrast, the traditional gender gap is still more prevalent in post-communist and developing societies where women are to the right of men in their political behavior.

This comparative research includes a comparison of social groups within societies by examining “cohort analysis to compare the size and direction of the ideological gap among older and younger generations” (2003:85). The premise for the Inglehart and Norris (2003)

examination of cohort effects was that the effects “emerge when formative experiences during childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood leave an enduring imprint on basic social values and core political attitudes” (85). The significance of the cohort effects is more evident in post-industrial societies, “where the modern gender gap in ideology is strongest among the younger age groups, while the traditional gender gap persists among the elderly” (2003:99).

This comparative research, however, does not examine the influence of race and ethnicity on gender differences within societies. It also does not examine the influence of growing and diverse immigrant populations in each country. This analysis assumes that populations are static and are not constantly evolving. It does not account for the incoming waves of immigration and different immigrant generations over time. The U.S. includes a growing foreign born population, with the largest number coming from Asian and Latin American countries. Much of this growing population is made up of female immigrants, who are migrating to the U.S. from almost every country at higher numbers than men (Jones-Correa, 1998b: 336). This growing number of Latinas in particular can significantly affect the political behavior of their communities.

Further research on the gender gap phenomenon can delve deeper into the complex gender dynamic in political behavior. This paper is both an extension of previous work on the phenomenon of the gender gap and a more nuanced analysis of within group differences. More specifically, it is a within group analysis of the diverse U.S. Latino population and the interacting factors that may influence a gender gap. This includes unpacking more aspects of the gender category to include possible interactions with race/ethnicity, nativity, and generational status within the U.S. Latino population. The driving questions are what factors may impact a gender gap in Latino political ideology and interest? Does the gender gap reflect a U.S. modern gap or a more traditional gap?

### **Comparison of Latino Within Group Gender Differences**

The U.S. Latino pan-ethnic community includes a cultural grouping of people from more than 22 mainly Spanish-speaking nations. This diverse population includes a good test of the developmental theory of the gender gap, since it can provide a variety of generational differences within one pan-ethnic group in the U.S. The structural and cultural explanations of the gender gap can both be influenced by the Latino immigrant experience. The Latino community can include as many as six generational distinctions, with foreign born Latinos that are influenced by their home country experiences as well as native born Latinos that are socialized in the U.S.

The experience of immigration can bring a variety of cultural and economic changes to an immigrant population and their new host country. This experience can especially impact “the public and private lives of women—their labor force participation, their occupational concentration, their religiosity, their marital roles and satisfaction, and their autonomy and self-esteem” (Pedraza, 1991:321). Therefore the process of immigration can provide many changes to both structural factors and cultural attitudes for succeeding generations.

Latinos migrating from more developing societies to the post-industrial U.S may follow the path expressed by traditional assimilation theories (Gordon 1964; Gans 1992), where they will begin to grow into the attitudes and behaviors of their new host society over time and generations. They may also follow the path expressed by modernization theories that hold immigrant groups migrating to a post-industrial society will experience economic gains and develop and modernize their group attitudes (Norris and Inglehart, 2003). There is also concern that the groups will carry and retain their traditional home country attitudes and behaviors with them to their new host country. This dynamic is especially pertinent given that the Latino

political participation in the U.S. is generally lower than the rest of the population, mainly due to their high proportion of youth and foreign born populations.

Most of the limited cross-national research on the Latino gender gap generally finds that this gap is less distinct than the racial gap (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003; Lien 1998; Welch and Sigelman 1992) and the size of gaps can also vary by national origin group (Garcia-Bedolla et al.2007; Montoya 1996). A recent study (Bejarano, Manzano, and Montoya 2009) examines the influence of generational assimilation and Latino attitudes on gender equality, which is part of the Norris and Inglehart (2003) set of cultural explanations for the modern gender gap. The study finds a “distinction between the opinions of the most recent immigrants and other generational cohorts” (1), however generation and gender group are weak predictors of different attitudes on gender equality.

I extend this analysis to examine the influence of structural and cultural factors on the Latino gender gap, including the effect of generational assimilation. I hypothesize that later generations of Latinos will be more likely than first generation Latinos to show evidence of a realignment process in their political ideology, where women will move to the left of the men in later generations. Next, I hypothesize that later generations of Latinos will also be more likely than first generation Latinos to show evidence of a realignment process in their levels of political interest.

### **Comparing U.S. and Mexico on Political Ideology and Interest**

The Inglehart and Norris Gender Equality Scale classify all Latin American countries as less developed than the United States, which brings several modernization expectations of gender equality attitudes and political behavior. Latin American countries are rated as more egalitarian than other developing countries; however they are generally expected to be less egalitarian than

the U.S. (2003). The modernization expectations of gender equality attitudes include the expectation that assimilation bring modernizing gender values to immigrants, which will move them closer to the host population over time. A recent study examines these set of expectations and finds that gender equality attitudes in Mexico are not that different from the United States (Bejarano et al, 2009). Further, the more recent Latino immigrants to the U.S. show more “egalitarian gender values closer to that of the general U.S. population” (2009:10).

Based on these findings, this analysis further examines gender patterns in political attitudes in Mexico and the United States. Further analysis explores the generational cohort effects on U.S. Latino political attitudes. This study utilizes comparable data to Norris and Inglehart (2003), with the World Values Survey (WVS) and the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), to explore the presence of gender gaps and gender effects on political attitudes. Similar to Inglehart and Norris (2003), I test the statistical significance of the differences in political ideology and political interest in group means over time in both Mexico and the U.S., as well as across U.S. Latino generations. Differences of means, analysis of variance tests, and post-estimate multiple comparison tests are used to evaluate substantive and significant variation within and across various waves and generational cohorts.

First, political attitudes are compared between the United States and Mexico, using three waves of the World Value Surveys. I look at the same questions for three waves of the WVS in 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007. The responses for political ideology and political interest are disaggregated by gender and wave. *Political Ideology* is the respondent’s self-placement of political views on a left-right ideology scale, from ten for most right to one for most left on the scale. *Political interest* is the level of interest the respondent has for politics and

public affairs, which ranges from three for very interested, two for somewhat interested, to zero for not at all interested.

[Figure 1 Here: World Values Survey]

Figure 1 shows the comparative responses across time, countries, and gender on both WVS questions<sup>1</sup>. US men and women are generally more liberal than Mexican men and women, as well as more interested in politics and public affairs. A closer examination of the gender differences of means shows that there are no significant gender gaps for both questions over several waves within Mexico and the U.S. Mexico does show a significant ideological gap across time, with Mexican respondents becoming more conservative and less politically interested over time.

Next, I use indirect evidence of generational analysis to compare the size and direction of the U.S. Latino ideological gender gap. The 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) provides comparable survey data to the WVS (Fraga et al., 2006). The data set allows for a random sample of various Latino national origin groups in the country, as well as the ability to distinguish between six immigrant generational cohorts. This extensive data provide an in-depth analysis of the factors that can impact a potential Latino gender gap. The LNS responses for political ideology and political interest are disaggregated by gender and generational cohort. The LNS measure of *Political Ideology* is coded as three for conservative, two for middle of the road, and one for the left or liberal ideology. The LNS measure of *Political interest* is coded similarly to the WVS question.

[Figure 2 Here: Latino National Survey]

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A: Comparative Political Ideology and Political Interest in Mexico and the U.S. using the WVS.

Figure 2 shows the comparative responses across generational cohort and gender on both LNS questions<sup>2</sup>. More recent Latino immigrants are generally more conservative than later generations in the U.S. Further, later generations of Latinas are significantly more liberal than more recent Latina immigrants. There is only one significant gender gap among Latinos in the first generation, with Latinas reporting a slightly more conservative political ideology than Latino men. Latino levels of political interest increase over generational cohorts, with Latinos in the fourth generation reporting significantly more interest in politics than first generation Latinos. There are no significant gender gaps in levels of political interest across all of the six Latino generations.

Both figures demonstrate that contrary to modernization and assimilation expectations, there are few significant differences across gender, time, country, and generation for Mexico and the U.S. The modernity and assimilation research also suggest that opinions should shift across Latino generations in the U.S. There is evidence of realignment in Latina political ideology across generations, which is similar to the U.S. modern gender gap.

### **Social, Cultural, and Generational Effects on U.S. Latino Political Attitudes**

The next analysis examines the presence of gender gaps and gender effects on political attitudes, after additional social and cultural factors are incorporated. I test the hypotheses with the 2006 LNS survey data, which includes 8,634 (unweighted) interviews with Latino adult residents, 18 years and older, of the United States (Fraga et al., 2006). The data are drawn from 17 states and the District of Columbia and are a valid sample of approximately 90 percent of the Latino population in the United States. The LNS includes 3,896 male (45.14%) and 4,738 female (54.9%) respondents. The nationally representative sample (margin of error  $\pm 1.05\%$ ) of 8634 Latino origin respondents was drawn from a random sample of 11 million Latino self-identified

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B: U.S. Latino Political Ideology and Political Interest by Gender and Generation using the LNS.

households in the U.S. Telephone interviews were conducted in English and Spanish (and sometimes both) between November 2005 and August 2006.

Ordered logistic regression is used to evaluate the effects that gender, social structure, cultural structure, and Latino context have on political ideology and political interest. Data are weighted for the ordered logit analysis to reflect the composition of the U.S. national Latino population.

### **Independent Variables: Social Structure, Cultural Values, and Latino Context**

Inglehart and Norris (2003) examine the individual level factors that can explain changing ideological values and political behavior among men and women. The support for more liberal ideology is “expected to vary systematically according to structural factors, namely, participation in the paid labor force, class, education, marital status, union membership, and religiosity, as well as according to cultural factors, including attitudes toward gender equality, ...” (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:81). Accordingly, this analysis will incorporate similar variables to capture social structure and cultural values, with additional Latino specific predictors.

#### *Social Structure Variables*

*Age, Education, religiosity, employment, marital status, union member* are used to capture relevant aspects of social background. Homeownership is used as a proxy measure of class status or income, it is coded as a dichotomous variable where one indicates being a homeowner and zero indicates being a renter.

#### *Cultural Values*

*Gender Equality Scale* includes a summed scale of four 2006 LNS survey items that measure egalitarian attitudes about gender. They include 1) Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs (equal pay); 2) Men are better qualified to be political leaders

than women (leadership); 3) Mothers should be more responsible for caring for their children than fathers (childcare); 4) Women should have easy access to birth control/contraception (contraception). Responses for each range across a five point scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. They are coded so that that range moves from least to most supportive of equal gender roles. The scale includes a range from 20 for the most egalitarian attitudes to 4 for the most traditional gender attitudes.

#### *Generational Cohort and Latino Context*

The LNS offers a variety of information on family history of immigrant experience, which allows researchers to identify six distinctive immigrant generational cohorts. First, respondents identify their country of birth and family origin ancestry. Foreign born respondents provide their age at immigration, and all respondents are asked about country of birth for their parents and grandparents. This information provides six distinctive immigrant generational cohorts. The first generation is foreign born and arrived in the US after the age of ten. The 1.5 generation is also foreign born, but they arrived in the US by ten years of age. Next, the 2nd generation Latinos are U.S. born and have two foreign born parents. The 2.5 generation consists of those with one parent born in the US and one foreign born. The 3rd generation has both U.S. born parents. Finally, the 4th generation has grandparents that are U.S. born. These categories explain how far removed individuals are from the immigrant experience and signal degrees of ‘American’ assimilation.

Specific to the U.S. Latino population, I also account for national origin with Mexican origin as the excluded variable in the analysis, making it the comparison group for *Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, and Central/South Americans* that are coded as a series of dichotomous variables.

Additionally, a measure for *English proficiency* is included in the analysis; it was created from two survey questions on English and Spanish proficiency. It is based on a scale that ranges from zero for non-proficient English speakers to three for English proficient speakers.

Citizenship is measured with two variables, native born and naturalized. *Native born* is a dichotomous variable that is coded one to include Latinos who are native born to the U.S. or Puerto Rico and zero for those who are not. *Naturalized citizen* is also a dichotomous variable that is coded one to include foreign born Latinos who naturalized and zero for those who have not.

### **Results and Discussion**

Four models are estimated using ordered logit for the two ordered categorical dependent variables of political ideology and interest. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1-2, with ordered logit coefficients and standard errors reported in Table 1 and the estimated changes in predicted probabilities in Table 2.

[Table 1-2 Here: Gender, Social Structure, Cultural Values, and Latino Context]

Model 1 demonstrates that gender has a significant influence on Latino levels of political ideology and interest. Latinas are about 3 percent more conservative than Latino males, while Latino males are about 2.5 percent more likely than Latinas to report higher levels of political interest. The next three models include social structure (Model 2), cultural values with gender equality scales (Model 3), and Latino context variables (Model 4). The Latino specific contextual factors include country of origin, English proficiency, nativity and citizenship status.

In Models 2-4, gender is no longer significantly influencing political ideology after social structure variables, cultural values, and Latino specific factors are included. Gender is still significant in the political interest models, with Latinas reporting less interest in politics than

Latino males by 3 to 4 percent. Several social structure variables consistently influence political ideology across all models; with Latinos that are older, highly religious, married, and non-union members are more likely than Latinos that are younger, less religious, single, and union members to report a more conservative ideology. Older Latinos that are union members are also more likely to consistently report higher levels of political interest than younger Latinos without union membership.

The cultural values of gender equality also significantly influence both political ideology and political interest, with more egalitarian Latinos reporting more liberal ideologies and higher levels of political interest than Latinos with more traditional gender equality attitudes. Gender equality represents the strongest predictor of both Latino political ideology and interest across both Model 3 and 4.

In Model 4, the addition of Latino contextual variables has little effect on measures of political ideology. This set of contextual variables has some influence on levels of political interest, with Cubans reporting increased levels (Puerto Ricans and Central/South Americans reporting decreased levels) of political interest compared to Mexicans. Latinos with English proficiency and who are native born to the U.S. also report higher levels of political interest than Latinos who are not English proficient and who are foreign born.

Next, the models are then estimated with generation interaction effects for political ideology and political interest. This adds an important dimension to the examination of gender effects on Latino political ideology and interest. The results and estimated changes in predicted probabilities for the generation models are reported in Tables 3, which includes ordered logit coefficients and standard errors in the first column.

[Table 3 Here: Generation Interaction Effects]

Gender remains a significant predictor to the measures of political ideology for Latinos; Latinas are 8.8 percent more likely than Latino males to report a more conservative political ideology. The social structure variables of age, religiosity, and union membership remain significant predictors of Latino political ideology and political interest. Latinos with more egalitarian gender attitudes are more likely than Latinos with more traditional gender attitudes to have a more liberal ideology and higher levels of political interest, by 28.8 and 19.9 percent respectively.

Several Latino specific contextual variables remain significant predictors of political interest including national origin and English proficiency. The addition of the generational cohort dimension provides an additional test of assimilation expectations. Latinas in later generations are 14.2 percent more likely than first generation Latinas to report a more liberal political ideology. Meanwhile, Latinos in later generations are also 5.4 percent more likely than first generation Latinos to report a higher level of political interest.

### **Conclusion**

Previous research by Inglehart and Norris (2003) provides a comparative examination of structural and cultural trends that can influence the likelihood of a gender gap in political attitudes and behavior. I have introduced this analysis to incorporate additional factors that can influence gender differences in Latino political attitudes, including Latino specific factors such as their particular generational cohort. This introduces a further examination of how Latino attitudes fit into the U.S. modern gender gap phenomenon. The process of immigration and acculturation was previously found to have an influence on egalitarian gender attitudes of Latino immigrants in the U.S., which can then influence political attitudes and behavior.

In this analysis, there is an ideological gap evident in Mexico attitudes across time. There is no significant gender gap within Mexico or U.S. in their ideological attitudes. The additional analysis examines the potential ideological gap of U.S Latinos across gender and generation. There is a Latina ideological gap across generations, with later generations of Latinas holding more liberal ideologies compared to first generation Latinas. Further, there is only one significant gender gap apparent for first generation Latinos, with Latinas holding more conservative political ideologies than Latino males.

This demonstrates that by including additional Latino contextual factors in a study shows Latina realignment in their political ideology across generations, which is similar to the U.S. modern gender gap phenomenon. Therefore further gender gap analysis needs to capture the particular Latino immigrant experience in the U.S., with the addition of Latino generational exploration.

**Appendix A: Comparative Political Ideology and Political Interest in Mexico and the United States, by Gender and WVS wave.**

	Mexico				United States			
	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	F Test (wave)	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	F Test (wave)
<b>Political Ideology</b>								
Men	5.75 (.08)	6.48 (.12)	6.12 (.11)	<b>14</b> probF=.001	5.90 (.08)	5.78 (.09)	5.75 (.08)	1.05 probF=.35
Women	5.71 (.08)	6.64 (.13)	6.25 (.12)	<b>21.03</b> probF=.001	5.65 (.07)	5.83 (.07)	5.67 (.07)	1.87 probF=.16
Gender Diff. of Means	0.05 (.11)	-0.16 (.17)	-0.13 (.17)		0.25 (.10)	-0.05 (.12)	0.08 (.11)	
<b>Political Interest</b>								
Men	1.63 (.02)	1.50 (.02)	1.46 (.02)	<b>15.92</b> probF=.001	1.90 (.03)	1.93 (.03)	1.86 (.03)	1.28 probF=.28
Women	1.46 (.02)	1.39 (.02)	1.38 (.02)	<b>4.55</b> probF=.011	1.75 (.02)	1.75 (.03)	1.68 (.03)	2.14 probF=.12
Gender Diff. of Means	0.17 (.03)	0.11 (.03)	0.08 (.03)		0.16 (.04)	0.18 (.04)	0.18 (.04)	
				Total				Total
<b>N- Men</b>	1172	748	767	2687	766	508	625	1899
<b>N- Women</b>	1151	787	793	2731	776	692	624	2092
<b>N- Total</b>	2364	1535	1560	5418	1542	1200	1249	3991

Significance: \*p<=.05, \*\*p<=.01

Cell entries are mean responses for political ideology and political interest questions and standard errors in parentheses.

Source: World Values Survey (1994-1999) (1999-2004) (2005-2007)

Note: Political Ideology is coded as respondent's self-placement of political views on Left-right ideology scale, from 10= most right to 1=most left. Political Interest is coded as respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics with 3=very interested, 2=somewhat interested, 1=not at all interested.

<b>Appendix B: U.S. Latino Mean Political Ideology and Political Interest by Gender and Generation.</b>							
	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Gen</b>	<b>1.5 Gen</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Gen</b>	<b>2.5 Gen</b>	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Gen</b>	<b>4<sup>th</sup> Gen</b>	<b>F Test (gen)</b>
<b>Political Ideology</b>							
Men	2.19 (.02)	2.17 (.06)	2.11 (.05)	2.16 (.09)	2.16 (.07)	2.08 (.05)	0.90 Prob F=.48
Women	2.33 (.02)	2.21 (.06)	2.09 (.04)	2.01 (.09)	2.07 (.06)	1.95 (.06)	<b>14.77</b> prob F=.001
Gender Diff. of Means	<b>-0.15**</b> (.03)	-0.04 (.08)	0.02 (.06)	0.15 (.13)	0.09 (.09)	0.13 (.08)	
<b>Political Interest</b>							
Men	1.83 (.02)	2.03 (.04)	2.13 (.03)	2.29 (.06)	2.18 (.05)	2.25 (.04)	<b>38.33</b> ProbF=.001
Women	1.76 (.01)	1.90 (.04)	1.97 (.03)	1.99 (.05)	2.18 (.04)	2.17 (.04)	<b>43.81</b> prob F=.001
Gender Diff. of Means	0.07 (.02)	0.13 (.06)	0.16 (.05)	0.30 (.08)	-0.003 (.06)	0.08 (.05)	
							Total
<b>N- Men</b>	2470	273	489	115	237	301	3885
<b>N- Women</b>	3051	302	525	138	332	368	4716
<b>N- Total</b>	5521	575	1014	253	569	669	8601

Significance: \*p<= .05, \*\*p<=.01

Cell entries are mean responses for political ideology and political interest questions and standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Note: Political Ideology is coded as respondent's self-placement of political views on Left-right ideology scale, with 3= Conservative, 2= middle of the road, 1= Liberal. Political Interest is coded as respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics with 3=very interested, 2=somewhat interested, 1=not at all interested.

<b>Appendix C: LNS Variable Definition and Measurement for Table 1-3</b>		
<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Question</b>
Political Ideology	3= Conservative, 2= middle of the road, 1= Liberal	R's political ideology
Political Interest	3= very interested, 2= somewhat interested, 1= not at all interested	R's interest in politics and public affairs
Female	1= yes, 0= no	R is female
<i>Social Structure:</i>		
Age	Range of 18-97	R's age
Education	7= grad or professional degree, 6= 4yr college grad, 5= some college, 4= h.s. grad, 3= GED, 2= some h.s., 1= 8 <sup>th</sup> and below, 0= none	R's highest level of education
Religiosity	4 = more than once a wk, 3 = once a week, 2 = once a month, 1 = only major religious holidays, 0 = never attend church	How often R attends church.
Homeowner	1= homeowner, 0= not	R owns a home
Employed	2= full time/more than one job, 1= part time, 0= no employment	R's employment status
Married	1 = married, 0 = not married	R's marital status
Union member	1= Union member, 0= not	R's membership in a union
<i>Cultural Values:</i>		
Gender Equality Scale	20= egalitarian gender attitudes, 4= traditional gender attitudes	R's egalitarian gender response to 4 gender equality questions.
<i>Generational Cohort:</i>		
Generational Cohort	4= (grandparents US born) 3= parents US born, 2.5, 2, 1.5, 1= foreign born	R's generation
Female * Gen. Cohort		Female R's generation
<i>Latino Context:</i>		
Puerto Rican	1= yes, 0= no	R is Puerto Rican
Cuban	1= yes, 0= no	R is Cuban
Dominican	1= yes, 0= no	R is Dominican
Central/South American	1= yes, 0= no	R is Central/South American
English Proficiency	3= English proficient, 2= pretty well, 1= just a little, 0= none	R's English proficiency on a scale from 0-3
Native Born	1= yes, 0= no	R was born on U.S. mainland or Puerto Rico
Naturalized Citizen	1= yes, 0= no	R is a naturalized citizen


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
*WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.*

**Figure 1: Comparative Political Ideology and Political Interest in Mexico and the United States.**

Source: World Values Survey (1994-1999) (1999-2004) (2005-2007)

Note: Political Ideology is coded as respondent's self-placement of political views on Left-right ideology scale, from 10= most right to 1= most left. Political Interest is coded as respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics with 3= very interested, 2= somewhat interested, 1= not at all interested.

**Figure 2: U.S. Latino Mean Political Ideology and Political Interest by Gender and Generation.**



Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Note: Political Ideology is coded as respondent's self-placement of political views on Left-right ideology scale, with 3= Conservative, 2= middle of the road, 1= Liberal. Political Interest is coded as respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics with 3= very interested, 2= somewhat interested, 1= not at all interested.

<b>Table 1: Gender, Social Structure, and Cultural Values, and Latino Context Effects on U.S. Latino Measures of Political Ideology and Political Interest.</b>								
Variable	Political Ideology				Political Interest			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female	<b>.129*</b> (.056)	.038 (.061)	.106 (.063)	.094 (.136)	<b>-.118**</b> (.042)	<b>-.151***</b> (.046)	<b>-.226***</b> (.048)	<b>-.222***</b> (.049)
<i>Social Structure:</i>								
Age		<b>.014***</b> (.002)	<b>.013***</b> (.002)	<b>.012***</b> (.002)		<b>.012***</b> (.002)	<b>.012***</b> (.002)	<b>.013***</b> (.002)
Education		<b>-.047**</b> (.016)	-.014 (.017)	.003 (.019)		<b>.285***</b> (.013)	<b>.260***</b> (.014)	<b>.197***</b> (.015)
Religiosity		<b>.242***</b> (.023)	<b>.225***</b> (.024)	<b>.227***</b> (.024)		.031 (.018)	<b>.047*</b> (.018)	<b>.059***</b> (.019)
Homeowner		.046 (.062)	.082 (.063)	<b>.135*</b> (.066)		<b>.239***</b> (.045)	<b>.226***</b> (.048)	.039 (.051)
Employed		.003 (.034)	-.001 (.035)	-.006 (.035)		-.028 (.025)	-.042 (.026)	-.025 (.026)
Married		<b>.361***</b> (.063)	<b>.368***</b> (.064)	<b>.349***</b> (.065)		-.026 (.048)	-.011 (.049)	.076 (.050)
Union Member		<b>-.328***</b> (.082)	<b>-.326***</b> (.083)	<b>-.280***</b> (.085)		<b>.415***</b> (.066)	<b>.387***</b> (.068)	<b>.268***</b> (.070)
<i>Cultural Values:</i>								
Gender Equality Scale			<b>-.081***</b> (.010)	<b>-.076***</b> (.010)			<b>.067***</b> (.008)	<b>.059***</b> (.008)
<i>Latino Context:</i>								
Puerto Rican				.152 (.115)				<b>-.290**</b> (.091)
Cuban				<b>.466**</b> (.157)				<b>.252*</b> (.127)
Dominican				.296 (.164)				.009 (.128)
Central/ South Am.				-.048 (.092)				<b>-.164*</b> (.071)
English Proficiency				-.073 (.040)				<b>.253***</b> (.030)
Native Born				-.143 (.091)				<b>.195**</b> (.071)
Naturalized Citizen				-.029 (.092)				.125 (.069)
log likelihood	-4803.9	-4417.22	-4268.54	-4249.27	-8504.7	-7475.44	-7082.68	-6992.05
Pseudo R2	.0006	.0336	.0398	.0421	.0005	.0492	.0541	.0649
Chi-Square	5.42*	306.76** *	353.55***	373.97***	8.09*	773.12***	809.56***	970.64***
N	4423	4208	4093	4085	8271	7649	7300	7291
Significance: * p<=.05, ** p<=.01, ***p<=.001								
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey								
Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients and standard errors.								
Note: Reference categories include male, renter, non-employed, single, non-union member, Mexican, non-citizen.								

Variable	Political Ideology = 3 (conservative)				Political Interest >= 2 (somewhat to very interested)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female	<b>.031</b>	009	.026	.023	<b>-.025</b>	<b>-.030</b>	<b>-.043</b>	<b>-.042</b>
<i>Social Structure:</i>								
Age		<b>.251</b>	<b>.235</b>	<b>.209</b>		<b>.160</b>	<b>.167</b>	<b>.177</b>
Education		<b>-.081</b>	-.024	.005		<b>.306</b>	<b>.348</b>	<b>.264</b>
Religiosity		<b>.230</b>	<b>.214</b>	<b>.216</b>		.019	<b>.036</b>	<b>.046</b>
Homeowner		.011	.020	<b>.033</b>		<b>.037</b>	<b>.043</b>	.007
Employed		.002	-.0003	-.003		-.009	-.016	-.010
Married		<b>.087</b>	<b>.089</b>	<b>.085</b>		-.004	-.002	.014
Union Member		<b>-.078</b>	<b>-.078</b>	<b>-.067</b>		<b>.071</b>	<b>.069</b>	<b>.049</b>
<i>Cultural Values:</i>								
Gender Equality Scale			<b>-.313</b>	<b>-.295</b>			<b>.226</b>	<b>.200</b>
<i>Latino Specific:</i>								
Puerto Rican				.037				<b>-.058</b>
Cuban				<b>.116</b>				<b>.045</b>
Dominican				.073				.017
Central/ South Am.				-.012				<b>-.032</b>
English Proficiency				-.054				<b>.152</b>
Native Born				-.035				<b>.037</b>
Naturalized Citizen				-.007				.023
-Cell entries represent changes in the summed probabilities of identified values as a consequence of a minimum to maximum change in the value of the independent variable, with all others held constant Source: 2006 Latino National Survey								

<b>Table 3: Generation Interaction Effects on U.S. Latino Measures of Political Ideology and Political Interest.</b>				
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Political Ideology</b>		<b>Political Interest</b>	
	<b>Generation Model</b>	<b>=3 (Conservative)</b>	<b>Generation Model</b>	<b>&gt;= 2 (interested)</b>
Female	<b>.360**</b> (.123)	<b>.088</b>	-.161 (.094)	-.031
<i>Social Structure:</i>				
Age	<b>.012***</b> (.002)	<b>.210</b>	<b>.104***</b> (.002)	<b>.181</b>
Education	.004 (.019)	.007	<b>.197***</b> (.015)	<b>.265</b>
Religiosity	<b>.223***</b> (.024)	<b>.213</b>	<b>.062***</b> (.019)	<b>.047</b>
Homeowner	<b>.138*</b> (.066)	<b>.034</b>	.028 (.051)	.005
Employed	.003 (.035)	.002	-.028 (.026)	-.011
Married	<b>.345***</b> (.065)	<b>.084</b>	.076 (.050)	.015
Union Member	<b>-.272***</b> (.085)	<b>-.065</b>	<b>.269***</b> (.070)	<b>.049</b>
<i>Cultural Values:</i>				
Gender Equality Scale	<b>-.074***</b> (.010)	<b>-.288</b>	<b>.059***</b> (.008)	<b>.199</b>
<i>Generation:</i>				
Generational Cohort	-.037 (.061)	-.027	<b>.098*</b> (.050)	<b>.054</b>
Female * Gen. Cohort	<b>-.151*</b> (.060)	<b>-.142</b>	-.040 (.048)	-.031
<i>Latino Specific:</i>				
Puerto Rican	.011 (.127)	.003	<b>-.251*</b> (.100)	<b>-.050</b>
Cuban	<b>.438**</b> (.158)	<b>.109</b>	<b>.254*</b> (.128)	<b>.046</b>
Dominican	.250 (.164)	.062	.105 (.128)	.020
Central/ South Am.	-.076 (.093)	-.018	<b>-.156*</b> (.071)	<b>-.031</b>
English Proficiency	-.063 (.040)	-.047	<b>.245***</b> (.030)	<b>.147</b>
Native Born	.037 (.123)	.009	.078 (.097)	.015
Naturalized Citizen	-.029 (.092)	-.007	.123 (.069)	.023
log likelihood	-4230.71		-6966.95	
Pseudo R2	.0437		.0653	
Chi-Square	386.29***		972.84***	
N	4074		7269	
Significance: * p<=.05, ** p<=.01, ***p<=.001				
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey				
-Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients and standard errors. Cell entries also represent changes in the summed probabilities of identified values as a consequence of a minimum to maximum change in the value of the independent variable, with all others held constant				
Note: Reference categories include male*generational cohort.				